ISLAM POST-9/11: INDONESIA

Introduction
Islam in Indonesia is an exciting phenomenon. For, there is no one country in the world that can lay claim to a pluralist Islam the way the Indonesians can. Here, in a country where Muslims form an absolute majority – at least 85 percent of the population – its very physical and cultural disparateness, arguably, prevents any possibility of Islam incarnating itself as a homogenous, monolithic whole. Local variations of Muslim festivals that can vary substantially from region to region are but a single example of such diversities.

Professor Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, an Islamic scholar, sees the Indonesian Islamic experience as more “very diverse” but not necessarily plural. He argues that diversity is a physical phenomenon while empirical pluralism is a concept, a value: one of acceptance of diversity. That voices for an implementation of the shariah as a formally codified legal system as opposed to the current application of the Presidential Edict of 10 June 1991 can still be heard suggests that he may be right. The call to an Islamic state by some quarters only reinforces this position.

Even as there are voices asking for the establishment of an Islamic State, the inability of Islamic parties to make any substantial electoral inroads suggests that this is a minority position. Indonesian Muslims are largely unimpressed by calls for an Islamic state as demonstrated by their rejection even of the pro-shariah platform of the original Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in the 1999 general elections. It was not until the PKS took on a more practical electoral approach that the party dramatically improved its performance in the 2004 elections. A pragmatic PKS abandoned the proposal to implement the shariah and instead chose to take on more assuredly appealing issues such as the eradication of corruption and poverty alleviation. In April 2004, as a consequence, they took the capital city by storm and won the largest number of seats in DKI Jakarta’s legislature.

That the Jakarta Charter, a principle intended to propel the law towards islamisation, was never overwhelmingly popular is one more proof of the largely skeptical attitude of Indonesian Muslims towards attempts at codifying the shariah. The Islamists faction of the Investigative Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan), a body whose construction was encouraged by the Japanese occupiers at the point of their defeat, had wanted to include the “obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law” in the first principle of the Pancasila, the national ideology. As such it would ultimately be part of the country’s Constitution. The secular nationalists were, however, against such an inclusion not least because its very general tenor leaves the parameters of its enforcement largely uncertain. And so the so-called Jakarta Charter was dropped and in its stead, and at the urgings of the country’s Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) leadership, a compromise was reached and the first principle was amended to bring it closer to the Islamic doctrine of tauhid, the indivisibility of the oneness of God. Where once, as first proposed, the first principle was a simple matter of belief in God, it stands today as belief in “Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa”, a singular God.

Bearing in mind the Muslim dominance of the country, there is an expectation – especially by others – that Islam should easily be able to find an official foothold that would allow for the construction of an Islamic polity. Instead, the indication is that historically there is every incentive by the powers-that-be to limit this expectedly massive potential. Both Soekarno’s Old Order and Suharto’s New Order made it a point to curb the influence of Islamic political parties.

Then again, the country’s electoral records suggest a tendency by Indonesians themselves to hold political Islam at bay. The 1955 election result is an indicator of this inclination, which has proven to be resilient despite 32 years of choking political control by Suharto. The approximately 40 to 60 percent balance of power between the Islamic forces on the one hand and the secular-nationalists on the other has persisted into contemporary times. Both the 1999 and the 2004 general elections have deviated little from this equation, which appears to imply that the electorate, while overwhelmingly subscribing to Islam as a faith, want little to do with Islam as formal structures of state, governance and law.

Are these not legitimate indicators that pluralism in Indonesian Islam is not merely a concept but a received way of life? Are not the voices calling for greater formalization and consistently uniform practice a persistent minority? What then are the implications of such tendencies vis-à-vis the developments in Indonesian Islam within the context of today’s political developments, taking into account both internal and global influences that play into shaping Islamic thought?

The socio-political backdrop
No doubt the then secular nationalists included non-Muslim natives, but their numbers merely held the balance between the two main Muslim factions: santri and abangan. The Muslims were themselves divided and remain so until today resulting in a political Islam that can be said to cover the whole political spectrum, from moderate through to reactionary.

Two very large religio-social organizations dominate Indonesia’s Islamic landscape. The Muhammadiyah is urban-based and headquartered in Jogjakarta. The Nahdlatul Ulama, popularly referred to as NU, is largely rural-based with a stronghold in East Java. Between them they have the potential to mobilize some 70 million members, which makes them a political force to be reckoned with. Then there is Hizbut Tahrir that doubles up as a political party aspiring to a modern day Caliphate, but not necessarily a modernist Islam. The proponents of an Islamic state is the Majlis Mujahiddin Indonesia (MMI) headed by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir who stands accused by Washington as a master international terrorist from Jemaah Islamiah (JI), an underground movement whose existence is yet to be proven by hard facts. There was, too, the now formally disbanded controversial Laskar Jihad accused of much religious sectarianism and violence in such places as Ambon. Another group with proven violent tendencies is the Front Pembela Islam (FPI). Accused of thuggery and criminal protectionism, they are prone to vandalizing bars that stay open during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadhan. Like Laskar Jihad, the FPI’s Islamic ideological credentials are considered questionable by many quarters. Both these groups are alleged to have links with the country’s security forces and were instruments of state terror during the Suharto era.

Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) is another emerging influence in the Indonesian Islamic political mosaic. Headed by Ulil Abshar Abdallah, this faction is strongly supported by former NU head and Indonesian president, Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid. Making the most of the media, these modernist Muslims air their progressive and sometimes radical ideas through print and radio enabling a reasonably wide dissemination making their prominent members targets of abuse by conservative Muslims, including the Majlis Ugama Indonesia (MUI) headed by Din Shamsuddin, who now also heads the Muhammadiyah.

Post-9/11, more specifically after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, saw bombing campaigns of terror in Indonesia carried out by so-called Muslim extremists. The Bali bombing of 12 October 2002 perpetrated by alleged JI members is one example that hit the international the headlines. More than 200 perished. And because of this the international media charged Indonesia as a territory blighted by terror. This is well off the mark. It should be noted here that this perceived “lack of security” had much to do with criminal activity, both petty and serious, that plagued much of the streets of the country’s major cities due to high rates of unemployment resulting from the regional financial meltdown of 1997, which also accelerated the downfall of Suharto’s 32-year presidency.

And, thus was ushered in an era of pro-democracy reforms, better known as Reformasi. When factored into the political development of Indonesia, this latter can become the reason for Islam taking an unprecedented course, a re-orientation that would take it towards modernity. However, what push or/and pull factors would spur it in this direction remains uncertain.

From New Order Dictatorship to Reformasi Freedoms
The Suharto regime was notoriously oppressive. Ushered in by a bloodbath of frightening proportions that witnessed the violent annihilation of the free world’s largest ever communist party, the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), the so-called New Order government spearheaded by Suharto and backed by the Indonesian military had few compunctions about dealing severely with its critics.

Blatant oppression was supplemented with, for good measure, a manipulation of the electoral system and the elections. During Suharto’s 32 years, eight elections were held under very restricted conditions intended to ensure the success of his party, Golkar. Additionally, as a way of holding on to the support of the military, parliamentary seats were allocated to guarantee its participation in the country’s legislative process thus ensuring that parliament is nothing more than a rubber stamp for Suharto’s policies. Wasn’t Suharto, after all, a retired general?

Today though, the political atmosphere is a stark contrast; to borrow an economic term, one of almost perfect competition. Take the first free post-New Order elections; a process of weeding out political parties from participating in the 1999 general elections became necessary because of sheer numbers alone. There were at the time well over a hundred registered political parties aspiring for power, which simply means that there were few obstacles, if any, to their registration in the first place. And that Reformasi did indeed impact on the nation’s politics is clearly witnessed in the abolishing of the TNI parliamentary seats during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid.

It was this euphoric atmosphere of democratic freedoms, cultivated under interim president B J Habibie, which made possible the mushrooming of Islamic political parties. Obviously the Islamists must have thought that decades of global Islamic resurgence would make possible some kind of an Islamic government, but their lack of unity combined with the durability of secular nationalism proved too much even for a population that appeared, to all intents and purposes, to be gradually islamising.

Islam In Contemporary Indonesia
Today Islam in Indonesia is an interesting blossoming of thought and action. The spectrum covers the liberalism of the late Nurcholis Madjid on the one hand and the extremist tendency of Abu Bakar Ba’syir, on the other. Neither of these two polarities, however, appears likely to leave hope for Muslims to modernize within Islam.

The ideas of the former, affectionately known as Cak Nur, are drowned in a modernity that seems to have little faith in the ability of Islam to bring to the world and globalism an imprint that is its own. Rather, western notions of liberal democracy are dressed up as Islamic by matching Islamic values to its nearest democratic equivalent. This approach merely avoids the need to properly understand important indicators that seem to point to a different Islam. For example, the Quranic injunction of men as protectors of women [Qur’an: 4; 34], which begs the question whether gender equality is an Islamic tenet. If it is then the Islamic law on inheritance needs revising, for starters. But, as it stands in Islam there is a clear violation of the democratic principle of equality.

Further, a religion as the basis of faith is not sustainable without a notion of exclusivity. How does a Muslim maintain faith in the face of open proselytizing by other religions that maintain their exclusive identity as a chosen people? Cak Nur’s idea of deconstructing received Islam in favour of alignment with western democratic principles, which has the potential of undermining its integrity, has the tendency to unmake Islam and reconstruct it in the image of western democratic liberalism.

At the other end of the Islamic political spectrum, it goes without saying that where Abu Bakar Ba’syir intends to take Muslims does not bear rationalizing. An advocate of the Islamic state, this school of thought does not even realize it is merely a concept and that the Medina Charter of old cannot sustain a modern society of equal citizens. They are romantics; fundamentalists who refuse to acknowledge any reality outside of their supremacist ambit. Extremism then becomes them for how else can an intolerant position hope to gain ascendancy within extant democratic structures.

This leaves one political player in the field with the potential to give Islam a future in its own image: PKS. Why? Because of its pragmatic reformist position and it’s orderly, gradual approach to power.

Conclusion
There is no mistaking the preference for economic modernization as a solution to the country’s economic woes and that objective is to be accomplished through capitalist constructs, a position also embraced by PKS. However, capitalism is useful only insofar as it is an efficient accumulator of wealth which the Indonesian experience clearly suggest it is. Unfortunately, however, in Indonesia it is not afterwards prone to fair and equitable distribution of wealth, as is true elsewhere. This concern it is that might lead Indonesians to Islam’s potential for providing answers and in the process make for a modernization of Islamic practices that come from its own body of knowledge. This is already underway in the works of such Muhammadiyah scholars as Dr. Munir Mulkhan.

The case for PKS becoming the agent of modernisation in Islam can be made. Whether it will come to pass will depend on its leadership holding true to the party’s current policies of targeting the ordinary citizen within a democratic framework. An intelligent electorate will ensure that the party remains faithful to this potential. Nevertheless, people’s power is but one aspect of a power equation that can be ruthlessly crushed by a violent state apparatus and the intrigues of the ruling elite. In this respect the president incumbent’s broad mass appeal transcends political party allegiance and can, therefore, be a positive factor with respect to political alliances. His small party base makes preservation of his wide mass appeal essential if he intends to stay in power. This last is only possible through demonstrable socio-economic achievements. It is here that there can be a meeting of purpose between President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the PKS.


NOTE: Comments and constructive criticisms are much appreciated on this site. This is an abstract of the about to be published paper, “Islam Post-9/11: Trends and Opportunities for Modernisation”, written for the Asian Public Intellectual (API) Fellowship.